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PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS
in The New History of Originalism
The emergence of a new form of originalism has sparked an interest in the
theory’s past that is particularly welcome as developments on the Supreme
Court and in the Republican Party unsettle the theory’s place in American
law and politics. Our understanding of the theory’s development, however,
has been limited by an unfortunate and unnecessary division between what
are now two separate histories of originalism. One history examines the
theory’s development in academia and emphasizes the influence of
principled argument. A second investigates its role in politics and
highlights the role of conservative interests. This review essay identifies
this division and offers two ways to create a productive dialogue. It first
suggests we consider how political interests have shaped the academic
debates over originalism by influencing the institutions that produce those
debates. Second, it urges a reconsideration of how and why academic
debates have shaped the theory’s political uses. There is good reason to
consider whether principled constitutional argument, and thus the debates
of academics, have shaped the political uses of originalism even if the
theory’s most important advocates were motivated mostly – or even entirely
– by the pursuit of political advantage. Using these approaches to identify
the reciprocal influence of politics and principle on originalism’s past can
help produce the new history of originalism we need to understand,
evaluate, and influence the theory’s role in American law and politics.

Introduction
We have gone from too few histories of originalism to too many,
just when understanding the theory’s past is needed to help address its
suddenly uncertain future. For decades, originalism played an important and
stable role in American law and politics: it was the constitutional theory of
conservatives. 1 Today, it is still embraced by conservative judges,
academics, and ‘tea party’ revolutionaries, but its influence now extends to
leading progressive academics and judges like Jack Balkin and Justice
Kagan. 2 Yet there are also indications the theory’s influence may be starting
1

JONATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2005) [hereinafter O’NEILL, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY];
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as Political Practice: The Right’s Living
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006).
2
Post & Siegel, supra note 1; Christopher Schmidt, Popular Constitutionalism on the
Right: Some Lessons from the Tea Party, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 523 (2011); JACK M.
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to wane, including the death of Justice Scalia—originalism’s most visible
and perhaps most effective proponent—as well as disarray in the
Republican Party. 3
We understand these developments better because of a recent and
growing interest in originalism’s past, but the insight that literature offers
has been limited by an unfortunate and unnecessary division. Right now,
there are two separate histories of originalism. One examines originalism in
the academy and emphasizes the way principled argument has shaped the
theory’s development. 4 A second has investigated originalism’s political
history. It highlights how the theory has responded to conservative political
interests. 5
This essay provides a critical review of that literature that both calls
attention to this division and suggests a way to bridge it. It does not try to
critique or improve the practice of originalism itself. 6 It is agnostic on the
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 62 (2010) (testimony of Elena Kagan) (The founders
“sometimes…laid down very specific rules. Sometimes they laid down broad principles.
Either way we apply what they say, what they meant to do. So in that sense, we are all
originalists.”).
3
Eric Posner, Why Originalism will Fade, ERICPOSNER.COM (February 18, 2016),
http://ericposner.com/why-originalism-will-fade/. But see Jack Balkin, Why Originalism
(February
19,
2016),
Will
Not
Fade
Away,
BALKINIZATION
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/02/why-originalism-will-not-fade-away.html [hereinafter
Balkin, BALKINIZATION].
4
See, e.g., KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]; Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Saving Originalism,
113 MICH. L. REV. 1081 (2015) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012)); Lawrence B.
Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1935 [hereinafter
Solum, Unwritten]; Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
599 (2004) [hereinafter Whittington, New Originalism]; Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism
for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999) [hereinafter Barnett, Nonoriginalists].
5
See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 1; Mary Ziegler, Originalism Talk: A Legal
History, 2014 BYU L. REV. 869 [hereinafter Ziegler, Originalism Talk]; Dawn E. Johnsen,
Lessons from the Right: Progressive Constitutionalism for the Twenty-First Century, 1
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 239 (2007) [hereinafter Johnsen, Lessons from the Right].
6
It is not, for example, an intervention into the ongoing debates over whether the
methods of intellectual history should inform the practice of originalism. Lawrence B.
Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111 (2015)
[hereinafter Solum, Intellectual History]; G. Edward White, Intellectual History and
Constitutional Decision Making, 101 VA. L. REV. 1165 (2015) [hereinafter White,
Intellectual History]; Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism and Holism: Failures of Originalist
Translation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 935 (2015); Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding
in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism,
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proper originalist method and the propriety of originalism as a method of
constitutional interpretation. It instead aims to improve our understanding
of the theory as a historical phenomenon of importance to American law
and politics by creating a productive dialogue between originalism’s
academic and political histories. Its core claim is that we can create that
dialogue by building on insights produced by the recent investigations of
the conservative legal movement and by applying traditional, but too easily
forgotten, insights of intellectual history.
The emerging history of the conservative legal movement has shown
how political interests helped create institutions like the Federalist Society
and the law and economics movement, which have, in turn, had lasting
effects on constitutional debate. 7 Investigating similar links between
originalism and conservative interests can help connect originalism’s
academic and political histories. Originalism’s two histories can also be
brought into dialogue by re-considering whether the conservative activists
who use originalism in political debate have been constrained by boundaries
of legitimate legal argument, and thus by debates of academics, which help
establish those boundaries. Earlier efforts to explore this influence have
been undermined by understandable doubts that political activists regularly
place constitutional principle ahead of political interest. Thus, a primary
goal of this review essay is to offer a plausible account of how the limits of
principled argument might constrain the choices of political activists not in
spite of the political motivations of those activists but instead because of
those political motivations. 8
A productive dialogue between originalism’s political and academic
histories can help create a new history of originalism that is more than an
extension of the normative debates that have been underway for decades.
The current divided history of originalism implicitly debates whether
originalism has been a principled interpretive method or a mere
rationalization for conservatism. But that question is far too simple to
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721 (2013) [hereinafter Cornell, Intellectual History]. See generally
Symposium, The New Originalism in Constitutional Law, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 371
(2013).
7
See, e.g., AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKEY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST
SOCIETY AND THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION 20–21 (2015); STEVEN M. TELES,
THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE
LAW (2008) (hereinafter TELES, RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT).
8
See MEANING IN CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS 76 (James Tully ed.,
1988); James T. Kloppenberg, Thinking Historically: A Manifesto of Pragmatic
Hermeneutics, 9 MOD. INTELL. HIST. 201 (2012) [hereinafter Kloppenberg, Thinking
Historically]. Explorations of other aspects of this approach include Cornell, Intellectual
History, supra note 6, and Gienapp, Historicism and Holism, supra note 6.
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produce the insights we need to understand the theory’s past and guide its
future.

Originalism’s Two Histories
The growing interest in understanding originalism’s past is certainly
welcome. Whether one finds originalism a convincing theory of
constitutional interpretation or not, it has played a central role in American
law and politics for decades. 9 Studies of its development can help us
evaluate the remarkable changes that have characterized the theory’s recent
past, as well as provide insights into American political development and
the role constitutional theory plays in law and politics more generally.10
Unfortunately, the potential of this new interest has been limited by a
division between work on originalism’s development in academic debate
and in political fora.
Originalism’s Principled Past
Scholars became interested in originalism’s past about a decade
ago, but the history they have produced has proceeded along two different
tracks, each of which has examined originalism in different contexts, has
been driven by different concerns, and has provided different explanations
for the theory’s changes over time. One camp is largely populated by the
advocates of what is now called the ‘New Originalism.’ With important
support from the work of Jonathan O’Neill, 12 Keith Whittington, Lawrence
Solum, Randy Barnett, and others have turned to originalism’s past in order
to distinguish their arguments for ‘New Originalism’—which focuses on the
original public meaning of the constitution—from ‘Old Originalism’—an
interpretive method that emphasizes the intentions of the constitution’s
11

9

See, e.g., O’NEILL, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 1; Reva B. Siegel,
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional Change: The Case of
the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006) [hereinafter Siegel, De Facto ERA].
10
See Jamal Greene, How Constitutional Theory Matters, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1183
(2011) [hereinafter Greene, How Constitutional Theory Matters]; Johnsen, Lessons from
the Right, supra note 5.
11
See O’NEILL, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra, note 1; Reva B. Siegel, Dead or
Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008)
[hereinafter Siegel, Dead or Alive]; Jonathan O’Neill, Shaping Modern Constitutional
Theory: Bickel and Bork Confront the Warren Court, 65 REV. OF POL. 325 (2003)
[hereinafter O’Neill, Bickel and Bork]; Jonathan O’Neill, Raoul Berger and the Restoration
of Originalism, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 253 (2001) [hereinafter O’Neill, Raoul Berger].
12
See, e.g., O’NEILL, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 1.
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framers. 13 As a result, they have developed an account of originalism’s past
that uses law reviews as core sources and that emphasizes the ways that
principled argument has shaped the theory’s development. 14
In their account of originalism, the theory emerged when the Warren
and Burger Courts’ aggressive protection of individual rights alarmed
scholars concerned with judicial restraint, 15 popular sovereignty, 16 or
separation of powers, republican government, and the rule of law.17
Convinced these values were not being protected by political process
jurisprudence or calls for judicial restraint, Raoul Berger, Robert Bork, and
others refocused constitutional interpretation on the original intentions of
Constitution’s drafters. 18 Like the critics of the ‘Lochner Court’ whose
mantle they adopted, these scholars were concerned primarily with majority
rule and democratic legitimacy. 19 The focus of the ‘Old Originalism’ they
developed was the subjective intent of the founders, 20 which was used to
limit judicial discretion 21 and to criticize the Warren and Burger Courts.
They did not, however, produce a comprehensive theory of constitutional
interpretation. 22
Scholars began to abandon this Old Originalism in response to
academic challenges, intellectual developments, and changes in at the
13

Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683 (2012)
[hereinafter Greene, Original Intent] (arguing that the goal of this history was to
differentiate old and new originalism).
14
See WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 4; Delahunty &
Yoo, supra note 4; Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 641 (2013) [hereinafter Balkin, New Originalism]; Solum, Unwritten,
supra note 4; Barnett, Nonoriginalists, supra note 4, at 611–12; Lawrence B. Solum,
District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 927 (2009)
[hereinafter Solum, Heller]; Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 14; Michael W.
McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law,
98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1525 (1989) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND
LAW (1988); Earl Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 773,
779–95; see also Greene, Original Intent, supra note 13, at 1687 n.23 (calling Barnett’s
description of the shift from original intent to original meaning the “standard account”).
15
See Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 14, at 601–02 (“Above all,
originalism was a way of explaining what the Court had done wrong, and what it had done
wrong in this context was primarily to strike down government actions in the name of
individual rights.”).
16
Solum, Heller, supra note 14, at 930.
17
O’NEILL, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 110.
18
Id. at 93, 110, 131.
19
Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 14, at 601; Delahunty & Yoo, supra note
4.
20
Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 14 at 603.
21
Id. at 602; O’NEILL, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 107.
22
Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 14, at 601.
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Supreme Court. Academics like Paul Brest and Jefferson Powell raised
import questions about the theory. How could a single intent be derived
from the often-conflicting concerns of multiple authors? What is the proper
level of abstraction at which that intention should be described? Should it
matter that the founders themselves did not believe their intentions were
binding? And why should the ‘dead hand’ of the past control modern
American government? 23 Changes on the Court produced further
challenges. 24 When Rehnquist, Scalia, and other originalists joined the
Court, the theory needed to do more than critique a handful of Warren
Court decisions. It had to justify the exercise of judicial review more
broadly. 25 Intellectual developments shaped the response to these
challenges. Most important was the growing interest in history, which was
shared by leading non-originalist scholars like Akil Amar and Bruce
Ackerman, 26 and hermeneutic theory’s concern with textual meaning. 27
The result was ‘New Originalism.’ Unlike its predecessor, New
Originalism offers a comprehensive theory of constitutional interpretation
based on the original meaning of the constitution. 28 It is not just a critique
of the Warren Court, nor a mere effort to encourage judicial restraint. It is
an attempt to identify the proper role of the judge in our constitutional
democracy. 29 As a result, its appeal has not been limited to conservatives. It
has attracted scholars from a variety of political perspectives, including
libertarians like Randy Barnett and progressives like Jack Balkin. 30
This account of originalism’s past was developed and deployed to
clarify changes in the normative debates over the theory. But in doing so it
has offered an explanation for originalism’s development: why the theory
emerged, why it changed form from old to new originalism, and why it has
won ardent defenders. That explanation emphasizes the role of principled
constitutional argument. Originalism, in this account, was produced by
concerns with the legitimacy of the Warren Court’s approach to
23

Id. at 605–06.
See id. at 603–04.
25
See id. at 604.
26
Solum, Heller, supra note 14, at 932. See also, G. Edward White, The Arrival of
History in Constitutional Law Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485 (2002) [hereinafter White,
Arrival of History].
27
Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 14, at 606.
28
Solum, Heller, supra note 14, at 933.
29
Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 14, at 608–09.
30
See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Originalism, LEGAL THEORY BLOG
(Nov. 16, 2014, 7:13 PM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2014/11/legal-theorylexicon-originalism.html; Barnett, Nonoriginalists, supra note 4, at 611–12 [hereinafter
Solum, Lexicon].
24
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constitutional interpretation, shaped by the earnest efforts of academics to
find a principled approach to constitutional interpretation, and attracted
broad support because those academics shaped it into a plausible, practical,
and principled theory of constitutional interpretation. 31
Originalism’s Political Past
This emphasis on principled argument as a way to explain
originalism’s emergence and development is not shared by a second set of
scholars, who were attracted by different reasons to investigate a different
aspect of originalism’s past. Robert Post, Reva Siegel, Dawn Johnsen, Mary
Ziegler, and others have investigated what they call ‘originalism as political
practice.’ They have asked why interest groups chose to deploy originalist
arguments, how originalism is related to the goals of the conservative
movement, and what lessons originalism’s success can teach progressives. 32
They focused on actors outside the academy—primarily politicians and
interest groups—and how those actors used the theory to advance their
political interests. That focus made them quite skeptical that principled
argument is responsible for the ways that originalism has changed over
time. They concluded instead that originalism emerged to help conservative
activists legitimate their political interests, changed as those interests
changed, and has been so broadly adopted because it does that job well. 33
Robert Post and Reva Siegel sparked this investigation. 34 In a
seminal article, they concluded that originalism was a more or less blatant
effort ‘to alter the Constitution so as to infuse it with conservative political
principles.’ 35 Its success, they continued, ‘does not reflect the analytic force
31

Barnett, Nonoriginalists, supra note 4, at 617; see also McConnell, supra note 14;
Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411
(2013) [hereinafter Barnett, Gravitation]; Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 14.
32
See, e.g., Ziegler, Originalism Talk, supra note 5; Johnsen, Lessons from the Right,
supra note 5.
33
Mary Ziegler, Grassroots Originalism: Judicial Activism Arguments, the Abortion
Debate, and the Politics of Judicial Philosophy, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 201 (2013)
[hereinafter Ziegler, Grassroots]; Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial
Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 555, 558–62 (2010); Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97
GEO. L.J. 657, 696, 716 (2009) [hereinafter Greene, Selling] (“The success of originalism
results not from its penetrable logic, but from its consistency with a political morality
defended most ardently by originalism’s opponents.”) (noting originalism also is successful
because it appears value-neutral); Stefanie A. Lindquist, Joseph L. Smith & Frank B.
Cross, The Rhetoric of Restraint and the Ideology of Activism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 103,
104–06 (2007); Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 549.
34
Post & Siegel, supra note 1.
35
Id. at 561.
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of its jurisprudence, but instead depends upon its capacity to fuse aroused
citizens, government officials, and judges into a dynamic and broad-based
political movement.’ 36
To support these claims, they showed the political uses of
originalism. Ronald Reagan invoked it justify his appointments of Scalia,
Rehnquist, and others judges, who he expected to advance a narrow,
conservative, ideological agenda. Conservative outcomes, not neutral
processes, were his goal. 37 Conservative lawyers used originalism to
legitimate litigation they hoped would advance conservative preferences,
not neutral principles. 38 Republican politicians used the theory to urge their
supporters into action. 39 On the bench, it served the same ends. Scalia’s
dissent in Lawrence v. Texas was exemplary of his efforts to mobilize
conservative voters through his opinions. 40 And Scalia, Thomas, and other
originalist judges used the past to justify their conservative views when they
could, then ignored it when they could not. 41
Leading conservative intellectuals, interest groups, and politicians
shaped originalism to fit their political preferences. Focus on the Family
identified it with support for religious freedom and opposition to abortion,
the right to homosexual sex, and obscenity. 42 Socially conservative
organizations like Liberty Counsel ‘cashed out’ terms like the ‘respect for
the Constitution’ and for the ‘rule of law’ as fidelity to ‘traditional values of
religion, gender, and family.’ 43 Even for academics, originalism was a
political tool. Robert Bork, they argued, saw originalism as a call for the
restoration of a particular set of morals and customs. 44 Originalism, in this
view, was not a result of a principled search for the Constitution’s original
meaning. It was simply a re-description of conservative political values.
The theory has not changed over time in response to principled
argument; it arose to help conservatives criticize the liberal results of the
Warren Court 45 then changed along with conservative politics. 46 When
research suggested originalism would allow segregated schools in the
District of Columbia, conservative advocates ignored it. ‘[T]hose who
36

Id. at 549.
Id. at 556.
38
Id. at 575.
39
Id. at 565.
40
Id. at 567.
41
Id. at 562, 565.
42
Id. at 556 n.54.
43
Id. at 573.
44
Id. at 560 n.74.
45
Id. at 547.
46
Id. at 558.
37
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guided the political practice of originalism had no intention of assaulting
Bolling [v. Sharpe], much less Brown [v. Board of Education].’47
Originalists initially opposed the incorporation doctrine, but now agree the
First Amendment applies to the states. 48 Originalists once opposed elevated
scrutiny for sex-based classifications. Now they support it. 49 Those changes
were not a result of disinterested research. They were efforts to align
originalism with the latest developments in conservative politics. 50
Research by other scholars into archival sources and interviews
offers an opportunity to open dialogue between originalism’s two histories,
as I will discuss later, but it has also extended Siegel and Post’s insights.
Steve Teles, Mary Ziegler, and Jefferson Decker have confirmed that
originalism’s political value was well understood by conservative
activists. 51 Steve Teles’s study of the Meese Justice Department showed
that the Department turned to originalism in 1985 to justify legal policies
that the Reagan Administration was already pursuing. 52 In Reagan’s first
term, the Department sold those policies on a case by case basis, with
unsatisfactory results. 53 In the second term, the Department used
originalism to legitimate those same policies to legal experts and the
public. 54 Meese’s speechwriter recalled that the public discussions of
originalism were a way to
….give a philosophical context for those policy disputes
[including abortion and the Miranda v. Arizona decision], to
elevate the conservative legal view, to ‘these are not just the
policies that support the business community, but these are
political and legal issues that are rooted in something more
transcendent than the disputes of the moment.’....The
speeches, the rhetorical dimension of the department, were to
give context for all those other, more mechanical activities,

47

Id.
Id. at 559–60.
49
Id. at 559.
50
Id.
51
See JEFFERSON DECKER, THE OTHER RIGHTS REVOLUTION: CONSERVATIVE
LAWYERS AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2016); Ziegler, Originalism
Talk, supra note 5; Ziegler, Grassroots, supra note 33; Steven M. Teles, Transformative
Bureaucracy: Reagan’s Lawyers and the Dynamics of Political Investment, 23 STUD. AM.
POL. DEV. 61 (2009) [hereinafter Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy].
52
Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy, supra note 51, at 76.
53
Id. at 77.
54
Id.
48
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like filing suits and joining as amicus. 55
Originalism was many things, but for the conservative officials who
advanced it during Regan’s presidency, it was a tool to legitimate
conservative policies.
Likewise, the right to life movement saw originalism as a tool to
help them curb abortions. 56 Mary Ziegler studied the movement’s decision
to adopt originalism by supplementing public documents with internal
memoranda of the Reagan Administration, the National Right to Life
Committee, and other interest groups. 57 Prior to the Bork nomination, the
pro-life movement opposed originalism and used natural law and human
rights theories to argue the 14th Amendment created a constitutional right to
life for the unborn. 58 Their claims were inconsistent with the theory of
originalism and its implications, which called for overruling of Roe v. Wade
and the return of abortion rights questions to the political processes of the
states. 59 The movement did not even welcome originalism when Meese
made it the official constitutional theory of the Reagan Administration. 60
They changed their position only when they saw the political
benefits of joining the originalist coalition. 61 Their natural law and
fundamental rights arguments failed to convince lower courts to recognize
that the unborn had a legal right to life. 62 The Supreme Court also seemed
unwilling to change that basic assumption. 63 Efforts to ‘confirm’ the 14th
Amendment provided a right to life with a constitutional amendment
failed. 64 And the movement saw that opposing originalism limited their
influence over Reagan’s judicial appointments. 65 When the Bork
nomination failed, these concerns led them to publicly embrace
originalism. 66 This was not a change of heart. Among themselves, they
continued to agree that the fetus had a constitutional right to life supported
55

Id. (quoting Interview with McDowell, July 2007).
Ziegler, Originalism Talk, supra note 32, at 920.
57
Id. at 907–20.
58
Id. at 881–82.
59
Id. at 898, 919 (“[T]he constitutional theory that [abortion opponents] developed
before Roe . . . . stood in tension with interpretive theories centered on the idea of original
intent”).
60
Id. at 882.
61
Id. at 919–20.
62
Id. at 904–05.
63
Id. at 913 (citing City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Servs., 462 U.S. 416
(1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
64
Id. at 898–904.
65
Id. at 919.
66
Id.
56
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by natural law readings of the 14th Amendment. 67 But publicly they
deployed originalist arguments to criticize pro-choice Justices and to
endorse pro-life, Republican appointees. Originalism was a tool to expand
their influence over Republican judicial appointees, undermine Roe v.
Wade, and decrease abortions. 68
This view presents originalism as a post-hoc rationalization for
conservative political goals. 69 It gives conservatives grudging respect for
making originalism into a powerful tool for legitimating their politics, but it
is political motives that drive originalism’s development. Principle does not
play an important role, a stark contrast to the account offered by
originalism’s advocates.
A Divided History of a Connected Subject
The difficulty with these two literatures is not that they examine
originalism in different contexts. The theory has played an important role in
both academic debate and political life. Nor is it troublesome that they
pursue different goals. It is entirely legitimate to look to originalism’s past
to learn how politics shaped the theory’s uses and to discuss originalism’s
past to clarify ongoing normative debates. The problem is that the two
literatures do not engage one another, which diminishes our understanding
of the theory’s development over time and its role in law and politics.
There is a sharp division between the two historical accounts of originalism,
but clear connections between the orginalism’s academic and political life.
From the inception of modern originalism political actors have
regularly responded to and used the products of academics. Raoul Berger’s
Government by Judiciary is considered by many the starting point for
modern originalist theory, 70 and its publication was immediately hailed by
William F. Buckley in the pages of the National Review, the magazine
many consider the starting point for the intellectual integration of the
modern Republican Party. 71 In 1987, the Department of Justice published a
67

Id. at 921.
Id.
69
See Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition as Past and Present in Substantive Due Process
Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 535, 548 (2012); Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen
Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356 (2011); Johnsen, Lessons
from the Right, supra note 5; Greene, Original Intent, supra note 13, at 1689; Post & Siegel
supra note 1.
70
O’NEILL, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 1; Greene, How Constitutional
Theory Matters, supra note 10.
71
Ken I. Kersch, Ecumenicalism Through Constitutionalism: The Discursive
Development of Constitutional Conservatism in National Review, 1955–1980, 25 STUD.
68
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‘Guide to Litigators in Constitutional Cases,’ which ostensibly set out the
approach government litigators should take to arguing constitutional cases.
It made originalism as the official interpretive theory of the Reagan Justice
Department and many of its claims were backed by citations to Robert
Bork, Raoul Berger, and other early originalists. 72 Similarly, The
Constitution in the Year 2000, another publication of the DOJ’s Office of
Legal Policy, regularly cited the research of originalist academics to support
the goals of the conservative leadership of the DOJ. 73
Academic debate regularly responds to originalist argument by
political actors. The Court, of course, continually sparks debate. Consider
the attention District of Columbia v. Heller sparked in law reviews. 74 But
more traditional political actors shape legal debate as well. Attorney
General Ed Meese, for example, secured originalism’s place in academic
debate when he announced the Reagan Administration’s embrace of the
theory. 75 Critics of originalism responded to Meese’s claims. 76 Its academic
AM. POL. DEV. 86 (2011) [hereinafter Kersch, Ecumenicalism]; William F. Buckley Jr.,
Berger’s Big Book, NAT’L REV., Nov. 11, 1977, at 1320.
72
See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 3 (1987) [hereinafter GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LITIGATION] (citing Robert Bork and urging government attorneys to advance arguments
based on “original meaning”); GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION, supra at 4
(citing RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 5 (1977)); Dawn Johnsen, Windsor, Shelby County, and the
Demise of Originalism: A Personal Account, 89 IND. L.J. 3, 16 (2014) [hereinafter Johnsen,
Personal Account] (claiming that in these documents “the Reagan Administration relied
heavily upon Judge Bork's writings”).
73
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INTERPRETATION (1988) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000]. This publication
served as the model for THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B Siegel eds.,
2013).
74
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William J. Brennan, Jr., entered the fray that October with an address at Georgetown
University, to which Meese responded the next month in a speech before the Federalist
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supporters stepped in to defend him. 77
In addition, some of the same people have played an important role
in originalism’s political and academic life. Gary McDowell was a political
scientist and an advisor to Attorney General Meese who argued for
originalism in both positions. 78 Stephen Calebresi worked closely with
Meese when the Attorney General was promoting originalism most
aggressively, then became one of originalism’s most able defenders in
academia. 79 James McClellan spent much of his career as an academic
political scientist, but also worked as Chief Counsel for the Subcommittee
on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary when the
GOP controlled the upper chamber. 80 He later ran the Center for Judicial
Studies, which advanced originalist arguments in public debate by
publishing, among other things, Benchmarks, a law journal aimed at
educating the public that regularly supported originalist arguments. 81 Before
entering academia, Mike Paulsen, Randy Beck, John McGinnis, Michael
Rappaport, Doug Kmiec, and many others served in important roles in the
Reagan and Bush Justice Departments, then became powerful advocates for
Society Lawyers Division. These speeches remain among the most enduring statements of
the originalist creed and its critics.”) (footnotes and citations omitted).
76
See Post & Siegel, supra note 1; Paul Brest, Affirmative Action and the Constitution:
Three Theories, 72 IOWA L. REV. 281, 281 (1987); H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern
Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513 (1987); H. Jefferson Powell,
Reaching the Limits of Constitutional Scholarship, 80 NW. U. L. REV 1128 (1986)
(reviewing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES (1985)); H. Jefferson Powell,
Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987).
77
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78
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originalist methods in the academy. 82 Such interwoven relationships and
repeated interactions strongly suggest that the enduring similarities between
originalist argument in the academy and in politics did not occur by chance.

Bridging the Divide: Investigating Political Influences on
Principled Debate
The durable similarities and repeated interactions between
originalism’s academic and political lives suggest that a dialogue between
the theory’s academic and political histories would be productive. The
question is how to create that dialogue? One way is to follow the example
of recent research on the conservative legal movement. Led by Steve Teles,
scholars in a variety of disciplines have shown how conservative activists
responded to the realization that electoral victories did not immediately
transform public policy. 83 Many policy arenas had been constitutionalized
and when President Nixon’s four Supreme Court appointees did not
produce the counter-revolution conservatives hoped for, they looked for
new strategies. 84 Conservative interests like the Olin Foundation poured
resources into organizations that could help produce legal change. 85 They
recruited lawyers of quality and distinction, found volunteers to fund
82

Faculty & Staff: Mike Paulsen, UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS SCHOOL OF LAW,
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103 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (2009); John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport,
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lawsuits, developed intellectual resources, and then kept these assets
connected and working together. 86
The most successful of these organizations was The Federalist
Society. Started with seed money from the Olin Foundation and the
commitment of a group of law students, the Federalist Society has not only
helped feed talented lawyers into the growing number of conservative
public interest law firms, it has also helped credential a new set of judges
and academics who have acted as intellectual entrepreneurs. It has been a
remarkable success. 87 Amanda Hollis-Bruskey has shown how closely
connected the Federalist Society is with some of the most important
conservative victories of the last two decades. Arguments were developed
by Federalist Society academics, advanced by conservative public interest
law firms staffed by Federalist Society lawyers, presented to law clerks who
were members, and then embraced by Federalist Society judges, including
Scalia, Alito, and Roberts. 88
But the influence of this organizing on originalism is only beginning
to be investigated. Teles has examined originalism’s development in
government, but how the purposeful creation of organizations to advance
conservative goals has shaped the production of originalism has not been
explored. 89 Hollis-Bruskey’s study of the Federalist Society recognizes that
commitment to originalism is core commitment of its membership, but she
focuses on the impact of the society, not how its commitments were
developed. 90 More research like Erin Cady’s examination of the Olin
Foundation could help reveal important connections. 91

Bridging the Divide: Investigating Principle’s Influence on
Political Debate
A more serious challenge to generating dialogue between the
academic and political histories of originalism is to show the way the
principled debates of academics have shaped the political uses of the theory.
Neither scholars concerned with originalism’s political history nor those
interested in its academic history have embraced the few claims that
academic debates matter because conservative political actors share the
86
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principled motives of scholars. Even scholars willing to consider whether
principled argument has shaped the success of the conservative legal
movement have focused on the impact those debates have had on the courts
rather than on more traditional political actors.
Nevertheless, there is evidence that principle has shaped the way
that conservative political actors have used originalism. What this section
offers is an explanation for why that might be that does not depend on the
dubious assumption that most, or even many, political actors are share
academics’ concern for legal and constitutional principle. Instead, this
section assumes that political actors are motivated primarily – or perhaps
even exclusively - by their political goals. It then explains why those
political motivations might lead them to attend carefully to legal and
constitutional principle. Finally, it argues that such a politically motivated
concern with principle could lead conservative activists to shape their uses
of originalism in ways that are attentive to academic debates.
Principled Motives for Political Action
The only express effort to write a unified history of originalism is
Johnathan O’Neill’s Originalism in American Law and Politics.92 His
explanation for how the political and academic histories of originalism
interact, however, has not been embraced by either of the two current
histories of originalism. That may be in part because his narrative
emphasizes the role principled motives played in shaping the political uses
of originalism, a possibility both histories of originalism find dubious.
O’Neill’s narrative indicates that the political and academic histories
of originalism were connected because both were shaped by a similar
concern with legal and constitutional principle. In the 1980s, he argued,
there was a natural alignment between the majoritarian premises of both
originalism and the conservative movement. Academics like Robert Bork
and Raoul Berger were attracted to originalism because it advanced
majoritarian democracy. This part of his narrative has been adopted by
originalism’s academic history. 93 But he also argues that Originalism
attracted political actors like Edwin Meese and others for similar reasons. It
was originalism’s majoritarian thrust, O’Neill wrote, that attracted the
support of the Reagan administration and its supporters who ‘regarded
several Supreme Court decisions as politically distasteful, constitutionally
mistaken affronts to limited, representative government.’ 94 Originalism, he
92
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wrote, was sometimes dismissed as a ploy to advance conservative policy
goals. But, it was not merely a call for conservative results in constitutional
adjudication. The reason for originalism’s success in the 1980s was the
theory’s appeal ‘to the principle and rhetoric of limited government[,]
consent-based politics, . . . [and] its traditional understanding of the nature
of constitutional interpretation.’ 95
Those suggestions have not been embraced. Siegel and Post’s
article was published a year after O’Neill’s book and soundly rejected the
claim that principle has played an important role in originalism’s emergence
and development in the political arena. 96 For them and those that followed
them, the conservative movement’s use of originalism was merely
camouflage for the politics that were really driving the theory’s
development. 97 Those interested in Originalism’s academic history have
been equally dubious that principle has played in important role in
originalism outside the academy. Keith Whittington explicitly dismissed the
influence of principle outside the academy when he described the
emergence of the New Originalism. ‘I have no particular illusions,’ he
wrote, ‘about the consistency or sophistication of constitutional theorizing
on the bench.’ 98
Other scholars, including most prominently Jamal Greene, have
suggested that principle may have shaped originalism’s development
outside academia, but they have not considered whether principle
influenced traditional political actors. Greene argues that originalism
succeeded not just because it advanced conservative policies but also
because it had particular characteristics that made it an especially useful
tool for that purpose. 99 And, at moments, he suggests one of those
characteristics was consistency with principle. 100 A successful constitutional
theory, he writes, ‘requires both consistency with a dominant political
agenda and an accompanying narrative that promises consistency with
prevailing legal norms.’ 101 He further suggests that judges might be
particularly concerned with a constitutional theory’s consistency with legal
principle because they could lose prestige and influence by advancing
95
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unprincipled theories. 102 But ultimately he does not extend that argument to
include traditional political actors, or explore how a concern with principle
might have shaped originalism’s development. 103
There are good reasons for these doubts. At first glance it is unclear
why hard-boiled political activists should care about the views of ivory
tower academics. That is particularly true when those activists can develop
arguments on their own, as the Meese Justice Department did. Under
Meese’s leadership, the Department dedicated tremendous energy to
developing originalist ideas. It invited speakers, hosted discussions, and
created opportunities for its lawyers to not just learn about originalism, but
take part in shaping it. 104 Justice Scalia, Judge Bork, and other luminaries of
the conservative legal movement took part in these discussions. 105 And the
results poured out of the Department’s Office of Legal Policy in a series of
reports, source books, and directives, all of which helped define
originalism. 106 If activists could develop originalist arguments that
legitimated their political goals without the help of ivory tower academics,
why listen to them?
Political Motives for Principled Action
Perhaps, however, those hard-boiled political activists cared about
the limits of principled argument—and thus the debates of academics— not
in spite of, but because of their political motivation. Perhaps principle might
shape an actor’s behavior even if it is not a motive for action. 107 If so,
conservative activists may well have seen constitutional principles as posthoc rationalizations for their political goals, but nevertheless felt
constrained to shape their behavior to be consistent with those principles.
And that concern with principle may have led them to attend to the state of
academic debate, which helps determine the limits of principled argument.
The possibility of a politically motivated concern with principle can
be developed from insights that reoriented intellectual history in the
1960s. 108 Those insights emerged from work by University of Cambridge
102
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colleagues J. G. A. Pocock, Peter Laslett, Quentin Skinner, and others who
revolutionized the history of political thought by drawing on insights about
the character of language that can be traced from J.L. Austin and other midtwentieth century philosophers of language, to Ludwig Wittgenstein and
beyond. 109 Those insights led the ‘Cambridge School’ to abandon the view
that language was a relatively transparent medium for the representation of
ideas. 110 Instead, they saw language as a historically situated social
convention; both the meaning of individual words and the structures within
which those words drew their meaning changed over time. 111 As a result,
they abandoned the effort to use intellectual history to answer perennial
philosophical questions by finding in great texts a set of static fundamental
concepts. 112 Instead, the task they set themselves was to explain how and
why particular changes in language occurred. 113
This new focus produced at least two insights with important
implications for today’s history of originalism. One is that language, and the
principles it describes, change as a result of politically motivated
manipulations. ‘[P]olitical words,’ wrote Daniel Rogers, ‘take their meaning
from the tasks to which their users bend them. They are instruments,
rallying cries, tools of persuasion.’ Or, as James Tully wrote, ‘the pen is a
mighty sword.’ 114 This insight has been embraced by political history of
originalism, which describes how conservatives have manipulated
originalist arguments to advance their goals. 115
But the view of language as a social convention has other
implications, too. It also means there are limits to the ways political actors
can manipulate language. 116 If language is a social construct, the meaning it
creates is not objective, but it is ‘intersubjective,’ that is: the criteria that
109
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determine whether a term applies to a particular act are set by the term’s
common use, not by the assertions of the actor who is trying to manipulate
it. 117 As a result, when an actor tries to manipulate language to legitimate
his behavior or political goals, he does not get to determine himself whether
or not he has succeeded. 118 The success of his attempted manipulation will
be determined by the larger community of language users. That means an
actor might to go too far in his attempts to, for example, manipulate an
existing commendatory term so that could apply to his dubious actions. By
‘going too far’ he could make clear to observers that he had changed the
term’s meaning. He would thereby undermine his claim that his action was
legitimate because it could be fairly described by the commendatory
term. 119 Alternatively, the actor could undermine his efforts to legitimate his
behavior by acting in ways that made clear he was not motivated by the
principles he espoused. 120
The intersubjectivity of language might also limit the ability of
actors to manipulate legal and constitutional principle. Legal principle
might shape the behavior of hard-boiled political operatives using it only as
a post-hoc rationalization because allowing it to shape their behavior would
be the only way it could be an effective rationalization. When political
actors use legal and constitutional principles to rationalize their behavior,
they are doing it for a purpose. They are seeking to legitimate actions or
policies they worry might otherwise be considered inappropriate or
illegitimate. Under such circumstances, the actor would need to claim that
his behavior was in fact motivated by some approved set of principles, and
once he had done so, would then need to act in ways that make his claim
seem plausible. Otherwise, those principles would fail to legitimate his
actions. If he failed to act in accordance with his professed principles, those
principles would not be effective tools for legitimation. 121 One implication
of this insight is that the courses of actions the actor could take would be
limited by the range of principles that he could plausibly claim motivated
his action. 122 As a result, the problem facing an actor seeking to pursue a
debatable course is not just how to shape existing principles to fit his goals,
117
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but also how to shape his goals to fit the principles that might plausibly
legitimate them. 123 Principle, in other words, could shape a political actor’s
actions even if he saw them only as tools to advance his interests.
Leading contemporary historians of political thought have applied
similar insights to great effect. 124 And the claim that the limits of principled
legal reasoning shaped political action is a core finding of some of the best
recent legal history, a field where ideas and power collide ‘head on.’ 125
Charles W. McCurdy, for example, showed how a popular property reform
movement in the 19th century was shaped by the ‘distinctive logics’ of both
party politics and law. 126 Cynthia Nicoletti has applied a similar insight to
ways that arguments about secession both shaped and was shaped by the
Civil War and reconstruction. 127 Other examples include recent studies of
how legal ideas both shaped and were shaped by the fight for civil rights, 128
welfare rights, 129 workers’ rights, 130 the realignment of political parties,131
and the construction of the administrative state. 132 Ken Kersch has
described how constitutional discourse in politics helps build, undermine,
and rebuild party and political regimes in a manner consistent with this
insight. 133

123

Skinner, Meaning and Understanding, supra note 112.
DANIEL T. RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUTHS: KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLITICS
SINCE INDEPENDENCE (1987); JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL
DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870–1920
(1986) [hereinafter KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY].
125
Kloppenberg, Thinking Historically, supra note 8 at 207. See also G. Edward White,
Transforming History in the Postmodern Era, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1315 (1993) (reviewing
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS
OF LEGAL Orthodoxy (1992)) [hereinafter White, Transforming History].
126
CHARLES W. MCCURDY, THE ANTI-RENT ERA IN NEW YORK LAW AND POLITICS,
1839–1865 (2001).
127
CYNTHIA NICOLETTI, THE TREASON TRIAL OF JEFFERSON DAVIS: SECESSION IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE CIVIL WAR (2017)
128
RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007).
129
KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY: WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN
GOVERNANCE, 1935–1972 (2016).
130
SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW
RIGHT (2014).
131
REUEL SCHILLER, FORGING RIVALS: RACE, CLASS, LAW, AND THE COLLAPSE OF
POSTWAR LIBERALISM (2015).
132
DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940 (2014).
133
Ken I. Kersch, The Talking Cure: How Constitutional Argument Drives
Constitutional Development, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1083 (2014) [hereinafter Kersch, The Talking
Cure].
124

22

The New History of Originalism

[31-Mar-17

The same approach might also help explain how principled debates
over originalism could shape the way conservative activists used the theory,
even if they were using it as a rationalization. Certainly conservative
activists like Meese and the pro-life movement saw originalism as device to
legitimate their political preferences. 134 And it is at least plausible that legal
and constitutional principles legitimate action and have shared meanings
that could limit the behavior of those trying to use them as tools.
Thus, legal principle could have shaped the development of
originalism even if we accept that originalism is merely a rationalization for
conservatism. An advocate of originalism motivated entirely by her political
goals would see originalism as a tool to legitimate those goals to judges,
politicians, the public, or, ideally, all three. Further, she would recognize
that for originalism to be an effective tool for legitimating her goals, it
would have to appear to be more than a mere rationalization for her
conservative political preferences. To succeed in legitimating her political
preferences, it must appear to be principled. As a result, she would try to
ensure that her claims about originalism as a theory were consistent with
relevant legal materials and our constitutional traditions. She would also
make sure that her claims about originalism’s implications were plausible
interpretations of the existing historical evidence, relevant legal materials,
and the theory itself. If those materials could plausibly justify only a limited
range of arguments and actions, then this advocate would not simply alter
originalism correspond to her goals political. She would work to ensure that
her alterations of the theory were plausibly consistent with those principles,
she would shape her claims about the theory’s implications to ensure they
too were plausible, and she may even choose to pursue a political strategy
that was plausibly consistent with originalism rather than another that was
not. What is more, such a politically motivated advocate would have good
reason to attend to the debates of academics: those debates play an
important role in determining what counts as principled debate, and what
counts as off-the-wall raving. 135 It is, for example, more difficult to dismiss
an argument as frivolous when it has the support of the Charles Warren
Senior Fellow in Legal History at Harvard Law School. 136
134
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This approach to the relationship of constitutional principle recognizes
that principled debate might affect politics, but it does not simply reduce
principle to politics, or ignore the complexities of academic life that make it
more than politics by other means. It thus offers a way to bring the
academic and political history of originalism into dialogue without reducing
one to the other. It does not, of course, prove that legal principle had an
important effect on the political uses of originalism. Nor does it prove that
politics, rather than principle, motivated originalism’s advocates. Those are
empirical question. And one can fairly question whether this argument is
based on a simplistic and inaccurate view of the relationship between
interests and ideas, politics and principle, and political, social, and
intellectual history. One may see interests shaping ideas just as those ideas
help actors to determine their interests. Ideas and action may be opposite
sides of the same coin. Efforts to pry them apart may be doomed to failure,
as might efforts to separate social, intellectual, and political history. ‘All
social activity,’ Keith Michael Baker has reminded us, ‘has an intellectual
dimension that gives it meaning, just as all intellectual activity has a social
dimension that gives it its point.’137 This essay, however, does not try to
resolve those devilishly difficult issues because doing so is not necessary to
create a productive dialogue between originalism’s political and academic
histories.
What this essay does claim is that there are good reasons to investigate
how the principled debates of academics have shaped the political uses of
originalism. That effect might occur because politically motivated
conservative activists believe at least some respect for principle is necessary
to make originalism an effective tool. It might occur because those
conservative activists have mixed motives. It might occur because it is
impossible to differentiate principle and politics, ideas and action. It might
occur because of a combination of those reasons, or for some other reason.
This essay has assumed a straightforward division between ideas and action
and emphasized the political motives of conservative activists to show that
principled debates might have shaped originalism’s political uses even if we
make the most cynical assumptions about the motivations of conservative
activists and the role of ideas in politics. By doing so it hopes to show that
questions about the relationship between principle and politics in
originalism’s past cannot be simply assumed away.
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The potential of this approach is implicit in a handful of works that
offer a glimpse of a what a new history of originalism could be. That
scholarship is not part of a self-conscious discussion, but its paucity does
not undermine its potential. Even if its authors did not fully recognize it,
their work brings to the study of originalism a new approach that might
transform the field. Their work differs methodologically from other
examinations of originalism’s past because it looks past traditional legal
materials like judicial opinions and law review articles to archival and other
sources. It then uses the results of that difficult historical spadework to
illuminate with more precision the reasons political activists turned towards
originalism and how that choice affected their behavior. It thus provides the
insights necessary to reconsider the interaction of academic debate and
political action in originalism’s past.
One example of this new approach is Mary Ziegler’s examination of
the pro-life movement and its decision to embrace originalism, discussed
above. 138 She shows that the leadership of the pro-life movement embraced
originalism not because of principle but because of politics. They publicly
abandoned their natural law constitutionalism only after it failed in court
and in Congress, and only after they realized supporting originalism would
help them advance their goals in the Reagan administration. 139 But this
strategy had costs. 140 When they adopted originalism they abandoned their
fight to establish that a fetus had not just a moral, but a constitutional right
to life grounded in the 14th Amendment. 141 Instead, they, like other
originalists, argued abortion should be regulated by the political process of
the states, not the judiciary. 142 Energy they had poured into changing public
attitudes with constitutional and moral arguments was re-directed towards a
debate over constitutional interpretation. 143 When they became originalists,
Ziegler wrote, ’abortion opponents had to down-play their most deeply held
constitutional commitments. Instead of building support for their
fundamental beliefs, abortion opponents turned to [originalist] rhetoric that
promised an immediate political payoff.’ 144
But why did the pro-life movement’s leadership have to publicly
abandon those cherished principles? Why could they not keep their
originalist cake of immediate political gain and enjoy their deeply held
138
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commitments, too? The evidence indicates the pro-life movement made that
choice out of respect for legal principle, which they respected not in spite
of, but because of, their political motivations. The movement did not
abandon those commitments because of politics alone. Certainly they did
not change their views on the right to life. 145 Nor does it seem they were
motivated by constitutional principle. When they embraced originalism,
most members of the movement were not convinced originalism was the
best way to interpret the constitution. 146
Instead, it was their political motives that led them to respect the
principled implications of originalist argument and, in turn, accept those
painful trade-offs. They adopted originalism to legitimate their opposition
to abortion rights: to undermine Roe v. Wade, to generate support for prolife politicians, and to gain influence with the Reagan administration. 147 To
succeed in that project, they needed to act and argue as though they were
motivated by originalism’s principles. Otherwise, originalism would fail to
legitimate their claims. As a result, they supported only those claims that
were plausibly consistent with originalism as it was understood. Because
they could not plausibly claim that originalism established that a fetus had a
right to life anchored in the Fourteenth Amendment, they had to abandon
that claim and its potential benefits. They respected the limits of originalist
argument, not in spite of, but because of their political motives.
Another example is Jefferson Decker’s analysis of how conservative
lawyers inside the Reagan Administration used originalism when arguing
amongst themselves over Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence. The
issues arose when First English Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angles was appealed to the Supreme Court. 148 In First English, a fire
and flood had destroyed a camp and retreat owned by the First English
Lutheran Church. The church wanted to rebuild, but had to wait twenty-two
months because City of Los Angles refused to provide the necessary
permits. 149 The church argued that delay was improper and that it was thus
due compensation for this temporary and improper limit on the use of its
land.
The appeal presented an exciting opportunity to Roger Marzulla and
Thomas Hookano, two economic conservatives in the Environment and
Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice. Prior to
145
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government service they had worked at leading conservative public interest
law firms to expand the protections the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause
provided landowners. 150 First English offered a way to continue that work
by throwing the weight of the administration behind the claim that the Fifth
Amendment protected landowners from ‘temporary regulatory takings.’ The
Fifth Amendment had always required the government to compensate
landowners when the government took ownership of their land for public
purposes. But Marzulla and Hookano believed that landowners should be
compensated when government regulations improperly limited the use of
their land, even when the limit was only temporary. 151
Marzulla and Hookano, however, had a problem because Charles
Fried disagreed with them, and he was Solicitor General. 152 Among other
things, Fried feared such a doctrine would make it too easy for landowners
to raid the treasury. 153 A better way to for the courts to police illegitimate
government regulation, he believed, was the more lenient doctrine that had
developed as part of the Court’s 14th Amendment’s due process
jurisprudence. 154 Marzulla and Hookano tried to go over Fried’s head. They
reached out directly to Attorney General Meese to argue their brief, rather
than Fried’s, should be sent to the Court. 155 Isolated and opposed to
powerful interests inside the administration, Fried needed support. 156 He
found it in originalism.
Fried does not seem to have turned to originalism because of his
dedication to the theory as a matter of principle. His later rejection of
originalism suggests he was a lukewarm originalist, at best. 157 But First
English occurred in the shadow of the public debate over originalism.
Months earlier the administration had made originalism its official
interpretive method, and in that Fried saw an opportunity. The founders, he
wrote the Attorney General, would have easily distinguished an onerous
regulation from a taking and thus would have denied ‘temporary regulatory
takings’ existed. ‘Our respect for original intent makes us hostage to Clio,’
he wrote Meese, ‘and we must accept the consequences.’ 158
Fried’s invocation of originalism may not have been driven purely
150
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by principle, but the theory was also not just politics. Fried invoked
originalism to legitimate his position. He expected it to work because he
expected Meese and other conservatives inside the administration to respect
the principles they had been vigorously advocating in public. And it seems
he was right. Invoking originalism helped him fight to a draw against a
politically powerful group within the administration. 159 The economic
conservatives ultimately won the war. The Court in First English endorsed
the idea of temporary regulatory takings. But originalism helped Fried stop
the administration from calling on the Court to do so. The government’s
brief in the case adopted a compromise position, which fully satisfied
neither Fried nor his inter-administration opponents. 160
This event, Decker argued, suggests there was a real
….commitment to (some sort of) originalism by (some) key
people within the Reagan administration. And it
demonstrates that this commitment could have real
consequences. Originalism offered Charles Fried a way to
push back against a line of advocacy that he considered to
be radical and dangerous—and of defending that push-back
to his attorney general. For that reason, the Reagan
administration’s public commitment to a certain way of
reading the Constitution served as a genuine constraint on
the policy outcome that many in his administration would
have preferred. 161
Decker, like Ziegler, did not explicitly consider whether the
constraints he identified were the result of political motivations. But his
research, like hers, went beyond law reviews, judicial opinions, and
published sources to recapture examples of principle shaping the behavior
of the Meese Justice Department and the pro-life movement. And like
Ziegler, he did so without denying the clear importance of political motives.
Together, their work offers a glimpse of what a new history of originalism
might look like if we recognize that it is not necessary to make heroic
assumptions about the motivation of political activists in order to consider
whether principle might shape their behavior.
The next step towards bringing originalism’s academic and political
histories into dialogue is to consider how academic debate shaped what
159
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counted as a principled use of originalism. This is something neither Decker
nor Ziegler explicitly considered, but there is suggestive evidence
elsewhere. As discussed above, there has been significant overlap in both
the topics that have interested originalism’s academic and political
proponents, and sometimes those proponents have been the very same
people. 162 In addition, Ken Kersch has made clear at least one example of
an academic shaping the political debate over originalism. Before Raoul
Berger, originalist argument was a minor theme among the conservative
activists clustered around the National Review, and sometimes it was
explicitly rejected. But that changed after Raoul Berger added his respected
academic voice to earlier calls for originalism by Robert Bork and then
Justice Rehnquist. ‘With the publication of Harvard Law Professor Raoul
Berger’s manifesto Government by Judiciary in 1977,’ Kersch wrote, ‘the
center of gravity of conservative constitutional thought moved decidedly
[and] rooted itself in a commitment to the interpretive theory of
“originalism.”’ 163 Even if those activists saw Berger’s academic prestige as
nothing more than a tool to legitimate their preferences, Kersch still makes
his influence clear. That, in turn, suggests that academics may have helped
set the limits of principled debate which even the most cynical, hard-boiled,
political motivated activists felt would be wise to respect. 164

Conclusion
One of the byproducts of the emergence of New Originalism is a
welcome interest in originalism’s past. It has led originalism’s proponents
to look to the theory’s past to differentiate their arguments from the Old
Originalism of the 1980s. 165 New Originalism’s rise has also confirmed that
originalism more broadly has survived decades of pounding from its critics.
It may even be thriving. 166 That success has led other scholars to ask how
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that feat was accomplished and what we can learn from it. 167
Unfortunately, the accounts of originalism’s past have largely
developed independent of one another. Each has its own explanation for
originalism’s emergence and development over time. One emphasizes the
role of political interest. 168 The other emphasizes the influence of principled
argument. 169 This division is unproductive and unnecessary. We might find
a way to create a productive dialogue between these histories. We might do
so, first, by attending to the ways that conservative political interests have
affected academic debates by shaping the institutions that produce those
debates. And, second, we might recognize that even an advocate of
originalism motivated purely by politics might pay careful attention to
academic debates to ensure his arguments about the theory were plausible,
and then conform his behavior to match those arguments.
Opening a path to a new history of originalism offers new
opportunities to learn from originalism’s past. If we want to understand how
constitutional theory has influenced politics, 170 it is not enough to ask
whether Charles Fried’s arguments in the First English litigation were
motivated by a principled commitment to originalism’s truth or by his
policy differences with economic conservatives in the Reagan
administration. 171 We also need to ask how and to what extent originalism
helped him change the Department’s policy. 172 If we want to know what
lessons originalism offers to the left,173 it is not enough to know if the
leadership of the pro-life movement saw originalism as the most principled
method of constitutional interpretation or as useful camouflage for its
political agenda. We also need to ask what originalism offered them and
how embracing it shaped their behavior. 174
In this new history of originalism we can also begin to see
something else: an underappreciated role that academic debate plays in the
process of political change. Scholars have noted that academic debates can
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influence legal actors by legitimating particular arguments. 175 But a new
history of originalism might show those debates also shaped the behavior of
political actors, too. Surely, academic debates are not the only influence on
the political uses of originalism. Political interest must play a central role.
But perhaps the relationship between ideas, interests, and institutions,
between academics and politicians, is both more subtle and more important
than it currently appears.
This dialogue is not all that is necessary to build the more accurate
and complete history of originalism that we need to help manage the
theory’s uncertain future. Such a history also needs to embed the interaction
of legal principle and political interest in a broader context. To understand
the theory’s interaction with politics, we need to look beyond originalism’s
ability to advance particular policies. Exemplary is Ken Kersch’s
examination of the role the theory played in helping to create modern
conservatism by unifying a fractured conservative intellectual movement.176
And while current examinations of originalism’s history emphasize
connections between the theory, constitutional doctrine, and politics, G.
Edward White and Dan Rodgers have tied originalism’s emergence to much
broader changes in America’s relationship with the past. White has pointed
out that history re-entered constitutional debates not just through
originalism, but though critical and neo-republican interpretive approaches
as well. It was not just Robert Bork, but also Duncan Kennedy and Akil
Amar who turned towards history and away from political process theory.
White attributes that development to the decline of broad based modernist
assumptions that the past had no wisdom superior to contemporary social
science. 177 Rodgers sees a similar collapse in separation between the past
and present in both originalism and post-modern social theory. 178 Those
broader intellectual changes and the opportunities they offered the
advocates and opponents of originalism are crucial context for
understanding the theory’s development.
Combining that broader context with a productive dialogue between
originalism’s academic and political history can help produce a new, more
accurate, and more useful history of originalism. But it is also true that the
approach suggested here to the relationship of principle, politics, and
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motive is not limited to the analysis of originalism. Other legal theories can
be seen as efforts to legitimate political action by manipulating terms with
commonly understood meanings. So can moral and philosophical theories.
So too can history. And recognizing that history can play this role may help
explain why the debate over originalism’s past is in its current state. Those
skeptical of principle’s role in originalism’s history are also among the
theory’s most effective critics. 179 And among those who argue principle was
the driving force are some of the most effective advocates of originalism.180
Showing originalism’s principled core legitimates the theory. Revealing it
as camouflage for a controversial political agenda undermines it.
But just as politically motivated advocates of originalism could also
be deeply concerned with constitutional principle, so too can scholars
passionately concerned with the merits of originalism be simultaneously
dedicated to the best traditions of scholarly debate. Motivated by the
normative debate over originalism, and dedicated to the highest scholarly
standards, the current divided history of originalism has raised important
issues and provided powerful insights. As a result of it, we understand
better the role of constitutional theory in politics, what progressives can
learn from the right, and the differences between old and new originalism.
But to understand the theory’s current state and likely future, we need a new
history of originalism that has moved past the artificial division between the
theory’s academic and political histories and past the motives that created it.
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